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Inderjeet Parmar (City University London): “American Power and Philanthropic 
Warfare: from the war to end all wars to the democratic peace” 
“The greatest achievements of the United States have always tended towards peace, even when they 
have been warlike”1  
 
This article examines paradoxical and counter-intuitive linkages between the rise of 
American power, increasingly influential philanthropic foundations, and war, providing 
concrete evidence of ‘how power works’. In particular, the article shows the close inter-
relations and complementarity between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power, between elite private 
foundations and the American state. Considering philanthropic foundations and war together 
shows the complex means and forms American power took in its rise to globalism and, 
indeed does today, in an era of ‘humanitarian’ interventionism and the ‘democratic peace’. It 
is somewhat paradoxical that philanthropic foundations, uniformly committed to peace and 
peaceful means, not to mention the prosperity they argue peace promotes, should also be 
strongly and consistently supportive in practice of military interventions and outright warfare 
to promote their objects. The major American foundations are committed to a strategy of 
waging war for democracy as the basis of global peace. This article’s two inter-related case-
studies furnish historical evidence of foundations’ roles in bolstering the American state’s 
rationalisations and activities in favour of war – during World War I and after the Cold War. 
It shows how a relatively vaguely formulated idea, in the early twentieth century, about a link 
between democracy, international trade and peace, and a consequent link between autocracy 
and war, and the inability of the two kinds of system to co-exist became, after the Cold war’s 
end and with strong foundation backing, a social scientifically legitimated core of US military 
and civilian power strategies.  
This article also places formally private foundations at the heart of state strategies, and vice 
versa, rendering untenable several core claims of the Rockefeller, Carnegie and Ford 
foundations to scientific objectivity, ideo-political neutrality, and independence of the state.2 
Simultaneously, the article challenges and undermines those theories of the state that posit 
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either adversarial relations between state and society (such as pluralism and statism) or which 
otherwise impose a strict separation between them (third sector)3 or which suggest that one 
section of society (capitalists) tries to ‘colonise’ the state (instrumental Marxism).4  
The article begins by arguing for the linkage between American philanthropic foundations, 
the state and war, advancing a conceptualisation of foundation-state relations that was highly 
cooperative and interpenetrated in nature – particularly favouring a Gramscian approach. It 
then goes on briefly to consider two case studies – the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace and World War I, and the major foundations and the ‘democratic peace’ after the Cold 
War.  
Despite a growing literature critical of US foundations, especially the ‘Big 3’ - Ford, 
Carnegie and Rockefeller – and even some claims of a neo-Gramscian hegemony in the study 
of those elite institutions,5 it remains the case that approaches that tend to take American 
foundations’ claims at face value remain in the ascendant: as exemplars of his literature, two 
recent books will suffice: Helmut Anheier and David Hammack’s American Foundations 
(published by the centrist think tank, Brookings in 2010), and Olivier Zunz’s Philanthropy in 
America (published by Princeton University Press, 2011). Hence, in the mainstream literature 
on the subject, American foundations are largely seen as non-political, non-ideological, as 
beyond both the marketplace and the state – part of a ‘third sector’ that hovers somewhere 
above the fray of elections, party politics, and big business interests. The predominant image 
portrayed is one of organisations that promote progress, development, modernisation, peace, 
democracy, and the well-being of mankind. It would clearly be absurd, of course, to deny that 
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foundations do promote such things at least some of the time. But the main argument pursued 
here, based on the foundations’ own historical records, is that most of the above claims 
represent a series of fictions to be challenged, specifically in this article via a focus on war.  
War and philanthropy are not normally considered bed-fellows. Conventionally, it is states 
that make war. However, it is principally through philanthropic foundations’ links with the 
American state, i.e., federal executive, that they become embroiled in the politics of warfare. 
Rather than a fictional state – autonomously determining ‘national’ interests – which is the 
corollary of the third sectorist self image of US foundations, it is patently clear that the 
boundaries of ‘state’ and ‘society’ are blurred by innumerable links and overlaps between 
departments and state agencies – both civilian and military - and the world of foundations, 
think tanks, major corporations, and elite universities, among others. In that ‘state-oriented’ 
sphere, mindsets are shared, as are social and educational backgrounds, and the networks 
within which people work and circulate.6 Consequently, theories of or approaches to state-
society relations that emphasise cooperation and consensus building become central, rather 
than approaches that pit state against society, public versus private, or vice versa. Having 
considered at length elsewhere a number of such approaches – including Eisenach’s 
‘parastates’, arguments about state-private networks, epistemic communities, Hogan et al’s 
corporatist approach to US foreign relations’ history, and Hodgson’s foreign policy 
establishment argument7 – this article argues that the Gramscian approach takes into account 
most of what those approaches have to offer but also goes beyond them to provide a more 
compelling account. A Gramscian account is more critical rather than purely descriptive of 
elite power; it links political, economic and intellectual power in a systematic theory; offers 
an agency based approach to the making of history underpinned by the idea of hegemonic 
projects of historic blocs that consist of far broader sections of society than just elites and the 
state. Gramscian thought also advances the little known notion of ‘state spirit’ that prevails 
among leadership groups whether they are formally ‘in’ or ‘out’ of state deployment.8 [Need 
mre Gramsci here and some critique of others?] 
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Once it is accepted that ‘state’ and ‘society’, and especially ‘state’ and elite sections of 
society, are not mutually-exclusive but intertwined, symbiotic, and inseparable, the link 
between philanthropic foundations and war becomes clearer.9 As Charles Tilly argues, “war 
made the state and the state made war”.10 American power is seared with the badge of direct 
and indirect military conflict – its financial role in the Crimean War, the impact of the 
American Civil War, war against Spain in 1898, the two world wars and the Cold War, not to 
mention numerous military interventions in the Caribbean and Latin America. Philanthropic 
foundations – whether as parastates, part of a foreign policy establishment or state-private 
network, are implicated in very close relations with the American state and must therefore be 
associated with warfare, in their own way, and the rise and consolidation of US power in the 
world. And philanthropic foundations are at the strategic centre of close-knit networks that 
include influential think tanks, universities, and ad hoc groups interested in and involved with 
warfare. 
Comprehension of the role of philanthropic foundations inevitably requires a theory of the 
state and of state-elite society relations, even though conventional accounts tend to accept at 
face value claims about foundations’ independence of the state and of politics; indeed, their 
acceptance of third sectorism appears, by definition, to rule out the state’s role entirely. Yet, 
the two case studies that follow demonstrate the argument of this article very clearly – that 
philanthropic foundations, the American state, and war, are intimately related. Indeed, the 
first case study – set in the First World War - is especially significant because the specific 
foundation concerned was dedicated to international peace – it was part of its very name - yet 
declared war as the best path to it just a few short years after its creation. Interestingly, two of 
its earliest founders and leaders, Elihu Root and Nicholas Murray Butler, were awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize.11 The second case study, focused on the post-Cold War period, 
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demonstrates continued attachment to the same logic: that peace would result from 
interventionist (military and other) policies by democracies against non-democracies. It 
shows how a ‘peace’ theory was securitised/militarised12 in practice, transformed into the 
core legitimising theory for American power after the disappearance of the Soviet Union, its 
erstwhile global rival, and used to re-launch NATO as a global alliance of democracies, and 
to justify wars on Iraq and Libya.13  
Case Study 1: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) and World War I 
Peace, and the abolition of international war, lie at the heart of the CEIP’s stated raison d’etre. 
Founded in 1911, the Endowment had been germinating for several years in the minds of key 
individuals, including its benefactor, Andrew Carnegie. Despite its stated aims, however, 
CEIP never fully rejected war per se – it was not, and never became, an anti-war organisation. 
Despite this, there were early indications of a professed desire to ‘abolish war’ and, once 
accomplished, rather optimistically, to move on to another blot on civilisation.14 Yet, the 
portents were there from the beginning: its president, Elihu Root, who won the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1912, was President Theodore Roosevelt’s close confidant and secretary of war 
(1899-1904),15 and a firm supporter of the most ruthless violent methods in putting down the 
Filipino struggle for independence during and after the removal of Spanish colonial rule in 
that country. Indeed, Andrew Carnegie, despite his racially-rooted anti-imperialism, was also 
complicit by refusing to commit resources to investigating American military atrocities 
during the Filipino uprisings.16  
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Nevertheless, there is evidence that elements of the Endowment’s leadership did initially 
appear to try to make theirs a peace organisation. Butler, for example noted the need for 
international arbitration between nations and even a world parliament, as well as an 
international court of justice and police force. Meanwhile, James Brown Scott, CEIP’s 
secretary, noted the necessity of scientific study of the causes of war,17 and Root emphasised 
the role of science in providing “deeper insight into the cause of the disease, or which war is 
a symptom…”18 Yet, ambiguities and contradictions were evident: the causes of war 
appeared already to be known to CEIP men. To Butler, ‘education’ of the ‘masses’ via the 
mass media was essential, indicating that mass emotion and passion lay at the core of warlike 
behaviour and attitudes. Scott argued that primacy should be accorded to conveying the 
stubborn “facts” about war and peace to influence “strong men and the masses of men which 
we call nations…” Bad men and ignorant masses, effectively, caused “bad” wars, they argued; 
the remedy was to teach them “the lessons of the past”, particularly to promote the idea that 
peace brings prosperity, especially in the American case.19  
Of course, Scott conceded, the United States had progressed through a violent anti-colonial 
revolution and anti-Indian wars. But those were ‘good’ wars that helped “convert a 
wilderness into the safe and secure abodes of strong men and brave women…” To Scott, 
therefore, there were clear dichotomies between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ‘strong men’, and ‘good’ 
progressive wars and ‘bad’ other wars and violent conflicts. The American revolution, he 
claimed, made the country strong and united and ‘carried’ us into “unsuspected and 
undiscovered worlds”,20 suggesting that there was little or no agency involved, just an 
impersonal historical or natural force that propelled Americans into new territories, their 
beneficence to bestow, their manifest destiny to realise.21 Yet, there had been far too much 
attention paid in school texts to conflicts that were “accidents of history”, and too little on the 
“essentials”, according to Scott. 
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An interesting internal paper [1910-11] furthered the peace argument by revisiting the liberal 
contention of a powerful link between peace and international commerce. While international 
trade bound nations together, war was a drain on resources and prosperity. There was an 
ominous tone to other parts of the paper where it declared that isolation – self-imposed or not 
– was beyond the pale: there could be no isolation from the embrace of “the family of 
nations… the hermit kingdom,” it argued, “is annexed; China is opened up. If the nation will 
not meet the conditions of life and growth… it submits to force…”22 This indicates a 
commercial counterpart to the war for democratic peace argument favoured by democratic 
peace theory as developed in the 1980s. Further, it emphasised, true national independence is 
impossible in practice, a message directed at traditional American ‘isolationists’ as much as 
other parts of the world likely to fall prey to predatory colonial powers. In effect, this paper 
constitutes an almost ‘natural’ causes-of-war argument – war as something that happens to 
those who try to ‘go it alone’, almost as a law of nature, a social Darwinism that accepts the 
survival of the fittest idea.  
Despite ambiguities and contradictions, the outbreak and course of World War I brought 
matters to a head. Endowment staff based in its Paris office more or less uniformly joined the 
war effort in 1914.23 Nicholas Murray Butler looked forward to the end of hostilities ahead of 
which he hoped the Endowment would help prepare the masses for the federal government’s 
call to help build peace, in line with the Endowment’s spirit. After America’s entry to war, he 
spoke in the most strident terms about serving “the State and to play a man’s part in the 
world,”24 but in 1915, Butler was more conciliatory.  But other more strident CEIP leaders – 
such as US General Luke E. Wright retorted that while “The talk of peace is all right”, the 
Endowment should be assisting the country actively to prepare for war. Trustee US Senator 
John Williams disagreed, rejecting the view that “you keep peace by being prepared for war.” 
Furthering and deepening the argument, in line with the thinking of President Woodrow 
Wilson, Elihu Root argued that American participation in the War would help usher out the 
forces of the past that had caused the War – “dynastic policies” driven by greed and a lust for 
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territory and self-aggrandisement – and usher in a more democratic era, which would require 
large efforts to educate the masses.25  
The final push for determining the Endowment’s backing of American entry into WWI came 
just after 6 April 1917, when the US officially entered the War. Meeting less than a fortnight 
later, the Endowment’s trustees refused to support a resolution to the effect that CEIP do 
nothing to hinder American war preparations to defend freedom against aggression. Trustees 
felt this was far too weak and wanted a new resolution that would support accelerated war 
preparations, proposals for military conscription, and give full-throated backing to the 
president, government and nation. The redrafted resolution, passed unanimously, declared 
that “the most effectual means of promoting durable international peace is to prosecute the 
war against the Imperial Government of Germany to final victory for democracy…”26  
Elsewhere, Butler argued that democracy and peace were strongly inter-related,27 that 
democracy was the pinnacle of civilisation, and that democracy and autocracy could not co-
exist, and that war must be waged against Germany. He also emphasised, however, that 
history was characterised by “the struggle between the principle of good and the principle of 
evil…”, two principles that “cannot live together in this world. And,” hence, “that is why this 
contest must be settled by force of arms.” “Democracy,” he declared, “must in its way 
dispose of despotism or despotism will in its way overcome democracy.”28  
Peace through a war for democracy, a sentiment that fully echoed that expressed by 
President Wilson to a joint session of Congress, just prior to the official war declaration. 
Therein, Wilson indicated that it was his “constitutional duty” to prepare the nation for war 
against autocratic Germany as but a step towards setting up “among the really free and self-
governed peoples of the world … a concert of purpose and of action.” Autocratic, imperial 
Germany was run by “little groups of ambitious men” who paid no heed to their own peoples’ 
wishes or public opinion. Using ‘self-governed’ and democratic interchangeably, Wilson 
argued that systems run on those principles were alone capable of building a “concert for 
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peace” and noted how Russia after its February 1917 revolution had finally manifested its 
true character. The war would be one for “democracy, for the right of those who submit to 
authority to have a voice in their own governments…” It would be a war “for the principles 
that gave [America] birth and happiness and peace….”, a world “made safe for democracy”.29 
In the end, for Endowment and President, the higher goal was a particular kind of peace – a 
‘democratic’ peace – which meant that it was right and proper that war be waged to secure it. 
Indeed, the CEIP had fully supported “active and relentless prosecution of the war…”30 The 
war, Butler indicated, “ is essentially for a new international world, and a war for a new 
intranational world.”31 A world made safe for democracy, it was thought, required 
engineering regime change.  
Recent work in this area, however, has shifted attention away from the deeper interrogation 
of democracy promotion and a concert of democracies towards dissecting the tensions 
between the demands of the former and their impacts on the latter.32 Despite that, there is 
widespread agreement that Wilson, and by extension organisations like the CEIP, were 
animated by informal but deeply held ideas about the link between democracy and peace. Yet, 
there was also a belief that American power and democracy were synonymous and that a 
more powerful America would necessarily promote peace in the world. As Butler noted, as 
the United States “are destined to play an increasingly influential part in world organization 
and world policies”, its people needed to develop “a sense of responsibility for the part to be 
played by a great democracy in developing world civilization.”33 One way to facilitate that, 
he suggested, was by re-dedicating American elites to promoting US values and 
achievements: “I would make a world figure of Washington… of Hamilton and Jefferson, of 
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Marshall and Webster.. of Lincoln. I would make their names… and institutions… the 
property of the whole civilized world for the benefit of mankind…” America’s policy had to 
be to be “a model nation abroad,” undergirded by “the supremacy in the world of the rule of 
law….”34  
Conversely, Butler lamented the rise of popular belief in ‘self-determination’ for certain 
peoples – especially those who were “dependent” and likely to remain so for many centuries 
due to their “limitations in respect of the march of civilization”.35 According to Root, the 
fledgling League of Nations required American guidance based on America’s historical 
experience in solving the problem of representation of small and large states via federalism. 
The League, he argued, is an organization of “a civilized minority” of white nations “against 
a vast, semi-barbarous majority…”36 As the desire for self-determination among colonies 
increased, the more the Endowment complained about the consequences for integrative 
“nation-building”, “strategic security” and stability.37 The fault-lines in the concept of 
‘democracy’ were increasingly apparent: Butler’s was, as was President Wilson 
administration’s, a herrenvolk democracy in which blatant racial oppression – at home and 
abroad – was deemed compatible with democracy and egalitarianism: “ ‘democratic for the 
master race but tyrannical for the subordinate groups…’ ”38 It would be for American elites 
to define American interests at home and abroad and determine what kind of democracy 
would be promoted and where. 
As a result of CEIP’s wholehearted backing for Wilson, its Division of International Law was 
incorporated into the official machinery of the State Department – as its Bureau of 
International Law. This meant that the Endowment transferred to the American state its legal 
division’s personnel and equipment, and paid for an expansion of staff numbers to aid the war 
effort. The Division’s spending increased from $63,000 in 1915 to over $233, 000 in 1917 
and 1918. Scott was appointed Technical Adviser to US representatives at the Paris Peace 
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Conference, along with several other Endowment’s legal experts.39 Former secretary of state 
Robert Lansing, after the war, became a trustee of the Endowment.40 
President Wilson requested the Endowment to promote the League of Nations “to prepare the 
public’s mind… for a concert of nations” for peace, security and democracy after the war. 
There was broad support among Endowment leaders, such as Scott, for an international 
concert of peace, even if there were reservations about the precise form of the League of 
Nations. In 1916, for example, Scott republished under Endowment auspices a book entitled 
An Essay on a Congress of Nations, in which he retraced the historical roots of calls for 
international pacific unions, including the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel 
Kant. Though acknowledging that Kant did not argue that democracy necessarily leads to 
peaceful relations, Scott agreed that only a confederation of “free states” could truly deal 
reasonably with issues of war and peace.41 It is evident that Endowment figures sought in the 
deeper past sustenance for international cooperation schemes – centred on US power - of 
more immediate relevance, just as did more recent proponents of democratic peace theory.  
More controversially, however, the Endowment, whose Washington DC headquarters faced 
the White House and the State, War and Navy Building, donated use of one of its buildings to 
the Wilson administration’s notorious war propaganda agency, the Committee on Public 
Information (CPI).42 The CPI, as did the CEIP, endorsed the idea that American democratic 
principles were ready for application worldwide.43 The Endowment, and its leading figures, 
were nationalistic supporters of America’s prosecution of the war to end all wars, and played 
a key role in stifling anti-war dissent in the United States.44 President Wilson appointed 
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George Creel, a progressive publicist for war, to “sell the war” to the American people, which 
he did with considerable zeal, welding together official and unofficial organisations into a 
powerful force that crystallised pro-war opinion and led to the harassment and persecution of 
dissenters. It is estimated that CPI lecturers gave over 750,000 speeches to audiences totalling 
over 300,000,000 by the end of the War.45 Even before that, however, the Endowment had 
organised summer schools, national lecture programmes, teaching materials for the public 
school systems, to ‘educate’ people on issues related to the war.46 
Endowment figures, despite their scholarly credentials were heavily involved in both 
promoting support for the war and in stifling dissent. Columbia history professor, James T. 
Shotwell,47 for example, a CEIP trustee, was closely involved with the Carnegie Institution of 
Washington-funded and inspired National Board for Historical Service (NBHS)48 which 
collaborated with the CPI, promoting curricular reform and helping develop literature for 
schools and the public that promoted “patriotism, heroism, and sacrifice”, as well as the 
fundamental differences between German autocracy and American democracy. Shotwell, 
who effectively took leave from Columbia to set up and run the NBHS, self-consciously and 
deliberately placed scholarship at the service of the state, using it for “ ‘patriotic and 
educational ends’”, as if there were no tension, let alone contradiction, between the two. In 
that spirit, Shotwell consulted several state agencies, including the State Department, and the 
departments of Navy and Interior, who concluded that NBHS work closely with Creel’s CPI, 
which it duly did, setting up the CPI’s Division of Civic and Educational Cooperation, with 
Shotwell securing appointment as historical adviser to Creel’s Committee.49 Although 
Shotwell was formally committed to supplying ‘objective’ historical information to educate 
the people, and conducting no anti-German propaganda, it is clear that the opposite was the 
case. According to Josephson, many of the NBHS’ publications revealed “biased slant… 
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violated numerous scholarly rules. Quotations were often incorrect, sentences were changed 
and shifted to convey meanings other than those intended in the original documents, and 
points of history and international law were often misstated and incorrect.” Protests against 
such violations of scholarly rigour were suppressed by NBHS and its influential allies who 
edited key historical publications. In his enthusiasm for political influence, Shotwell adopted 
the propaganda methods of the Creel Committee which provided the latter “an air of 
[scholarly] authenticity which it might never have achieved” without the help of NBHS and 
its illustrious historians, whose number included Harvard’s Frederick Jackson Turner.50 The 
Division of Civic and Educational Cooperation, with Shotwell’s active assistance, published 
almost fifty pamphlets with a combined circulation of around 75 million copies.51 Despite the 
rather obviously “jingoistic” character of the NBHS and its publications, Shotwell, according 
to his biographer, “never made any direct attempt to restrain” his fellow historians, “and once 
even went so far as to encourage it,” accepting “the legitimacy of subordinating the past to 
the present” in order to remain near “the sources of power”.52 This he continued to do before, 
during and after the Paris Peace conferences as member of President Wilson’s Inquiry group 
of post-war planners.53 
Kennedy argues that “Nothing could be allowed to obscure the theme of autocracy versus 
democracy,” while discussion about imperialism and nationalism, which might diffuse 
responsibility for the war, was prohibited.54 The universities, including Shotwell’s Columbia, 
participated in army training programmes and were issued by NBHS with a “War Issues 
Course” which, again, reinforced the idea of the war as an existential struggle between 
‘decent’ democracy and ‘evil’ autocracy, perfectly logical for students being trained for 
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military combat, but problematic in institutions of higher learning,55 let alone a political order 
promoting itself as a model for global emulation. 
As Kennedy contends, seemingly sober scholars were as culpable in stifling dissent as their 
more populist pro-war fellow citizens of the National Security League (NSL). Yet, Kennedy 
omits mention of the numerous overlaps between the bellicose NSL and Carnegie 
philanthropy, including the Endowment. The NSL’s first president, Robert Bacon, was a 
CEIP trustee, as was the League’s honorary president, Joseph H. Choate. Elihu Root was also 
an NSL leader after the War.56 Even more significant was the fact that the Carnegie 
Corporation(CC)  – a sister foundation of the Endowment – was the NSL’s largest single 
source of funds – gifting it $150,000. Although turned down for funding by the Rockefeller 
Foundation, NSL received $35,000 from John D. Rockefeller.57 The CC’s gift was in 
violation of its charter commitment to steer clear of ‘politics’. The NSL was an anti-labour 
and anti-socialist organisation committed to the protection of private property, 100% 
Americanism, and stifling anti-war dissent.58 
Nicholas Murray Butler, Endowment director and Columbia University president, betrayed 
the “brittleness” of academic “decorum and rationality” in June 1917, when he announced 
that dissenting voices in wartime were intolerable and seditious. Any faculty members, Butler 
warned, echoing President Wilson, “who are not with whole heart and mind and strength 
committed to fight with us to make the world safe for democracy,” would speedily be 
ousted59 and, true to his word, Butler dismissed Columbia scholars who advocated peace or 
opposed conscription.60 Even before America’s entry to war, however, Columbia had pledged 
its loyalty “to the Government of the United States in all measures of national defense”, as 
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did Harvard, Chicago and many others.61 Butler demanded that Columbia students and 
faculty ask themselves: “Can I serve anywhere in the great army of peace-loving Americans 
who would only use force in order that right may speedily come to rule?”62 Knowledge 
mobilisation for a war for democracy to ensure peace, but intolerant of dissenters at home.   
It is appropriate that the idea of the democratic peace links both Wilson and the Endowment, 
purveyors of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, ‘public’ and ‘private’, power. Yet the link between democracy 
and peace in 1914-18, however well made, was largely rhetorical. The second case study 
shows how the link became underwritten and legitimised by democratic peace theory, social 
science’s only claim to a scientific law and, therefore, more powerful in rationalising 
continued US global activism in the absence of the “Soviet threat”. 
Case Study 2: Making a Peace Theory Fit for War: The securitisation of democratic peace 
theory 
Despite criticism, democratic peace theory (DPT) is widely held to be political science’s only 
scientific law, sometimes referred to as “Doyle’s Law”, after Michael Doyle, the Princeton 
scholar.63 The rise of DPT, however, is a case study of how ideas and catalytic events can 
combine to produce new mindsets and new rationales for national security strategies, how an 
old idea – that democracies tend not to fight wars against one another – was resurrected, 
repackaged and advanced as a new strategic rationale after the Cold War’s end. It began with 
the Clinton administration’s embrace of democratic enlargement and engagement 
programmes, undergirded George W. Bush’s ‘freedom agenda’ and the war on Iraq, and 
remained embedded within the democracy promotion and ‘dignity’ agendas of the Barack 
Obama administration.  
Immanuel Kant’s ‘pacific union’ of republics has developed through the idea of a federal 
Union of Democracies of the 1930s64 to the Community of Democracies of the 1990s,65 the 
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Princeton Project on National Security’s Concert of Democracies in the early 2000s, to the 
idea of NATO as the true embodiment of a global alliance of democracies.66 Knowledge 
networks centred on US philanthropic foundations, this case study argues, have been pivotal 
to both DPT’s resurrection and subsequent development and transformation. What might 
have been considered a ‘soft’ or ‘idealistic’ theory of democratic pacifism has been 
transformed into ‘hard’ Wilsonianism, or Wilsonianism with ‘teeth’.67 
The Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation played significant roles in the rise and 
development of DPT as policy technology. Ford funded Michael Doyle’s initial research and 
publication during the early 1980s with a grant of $90,000 on a project to consider the impact 
of domestic ideology and regime type on international economic behaviour.68 Doyle was also 
testing different theories of international politics focusing on impacts on policy outcomes of 
state-society relations. Working in the broader political context of the rise of Reaganomics 
and of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Doyle’s work emphasised the 
traditional liberal view that free markets promote peace while, significantly, also pointing out 
the dangers of liberal-state imperialism and military aggression.  The latter point is important 
because it was largely ‘forgotten’ by policymakers eager to exploit the potential of DPT in 
rationalising a new, more aggressive and interventionist post-Cold War strategy.69  
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Ford Foundation also funded Harvard’s Belfer Center on Science and International Affairs,70 
as well as its house journal, International Security, which performed a major role in refining 
DPT via publishing the empirical results of a series of tests of the theory, using large data sets. 
With Carnegie Corporation support, International Security published a DPT “Reader” in 
1996.71 The following year, Carnegie gifted $700,000 to Belfer specifically to develop and 
explore DPT’s policy implications and significantly to test the hypothesis that democratising 
states tend to favour militarism and war, especially during the first decade of democratisation, 
suggesting that the process had to be ‘handled with care’.72 
Carnegie philanthropy also played a key role in bringing greater attention and prominence to 
the work of arch democracy promoter, Larry Diamond.73 Diamond had, in the early 1990s, 
exercised considerable influence within the Democratic Party’s Progressive Policy Institute 
(PPI) think tank, linked with Bill Clinton’s Democratic Leadership Council. He was the 
policy entrepreneur, a bridge between academia and state, who translated DPT to the Clinton 
White House in the early 1990s. Diamond was responsible for converting a peace theory into 
‘hard’ power technology. In 1991, Diamond issued a report for PPI, “An American Foreign 
Policy for Democracy”, which recast DPT as the ideal rationalisation to grasp the opportunity 
offered to American power by the collapse of the Soviet bloc. It was, he noted, an historic 
opportunity “to reshape the world” and “to shape the political character of the entire world 
for generations..” Diamond’s report rejected traditional ideas about the ‘balance of power’, 
stability, order and the status quo. He also argued for the necessity of redefining national 
sovereignty to permit external intervention to promote democracy and spread freedom.74 
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By 1995, Diamond published Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, as part of the work of the 
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence. In it, he married the value of 
spreading democracy with a new idea – that transitions to democracy abroad could be carried 
out relatively simply and straight-forwardly and were not reliant on historical factors of 
societal pre-conditions. In the main, all that was required was willing political leaders to 
effect democratic transformations.75   
For Tony Smith, a combination of ideas – the alleged peaceful character of democracy, the 
ease with which democratic transitions could occur, and diminuition of national sovereignty 
on which external interventions depended, helped push an aggressive/coercive version of 
DPT to the fore. Proving influential in both the Democratic and Republican political parties, 
the combination was to have lethal consequences after 9-11. It was a peace theory that was 
“born fighting”, according to Smith.76 
Democratic peace theory helped rationalise an active US foreign and national security 
strategy after the Cold war: under Tony Lake’s guidance,77 it effectively divided the world 
into ‘red’ and ‘blue’ zones, zones to be expanded or diminished, zones of peace or of turmoil, 
a world of democracies and non-democracies in tension.78 The theory was, it was claimed, 
based on science rather than ideology. In the hands of President George W. Bush and his 
neoconservative allies, democratic peace theory proved anything but peaceful.79 
Conclusion 
Somewhat counter-intuitively, philanthropic foundations are immersed in a complex 
relationship with war, and its primary instrument, the state, despite their fictional self-
conceptualisation as above and beyond the real world of politics and government, the market 
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and big business. Their image remains associated with ‘soft’ power, even among many of its 
critics,80 operating as Joseph Nye argues through the power of attraction, i.e., philanthropy’s 
self-evident goodness and unconditional love of humanity.81 However, as the two case 
discussed above show, the Big 3 foundations are key moving forces in the elite networks that 
dominate the US foreign policy establishment whose mindsets are four-square behind 
American global preponderance that is heavily reliant on its coercive power.  
To the major foundations – Ford, Carnegie and Rockefeller – the words of Nicholas Murray 
Butler back in 1918 remain true: that fighting for peace is not a contradiction. This is because, 
as Butler noted, “peace is not an ideal at all; it is a state attendant upon the achievement of an 
ideal. The ideal itself is human liberty, justice, and the honourable conduct of an orderly and 
humane society. Given this, a durable peace follows naturally as a matter of course.”82 
Market-based democracies cannot indefinitely live side by side at peace with non-market 
democracies, socialist democracies or non-democracies, as defined by US elites. By 
definition, societies not ordered in the way considered humane and just by US elite standards 
incubate and invite hostility and war. As Butler opined, “The greatest achievements of the 
United States have always tended towards peace, even when they have been warlike,”83 a 
highly instructive comment from a time when the USA had yet to take up the mantle of 
global leadership, but indicative of a deeply-held conviction in the rightness of its mission. 
Presciently, Butler also anticipated post-Cold war ‘humanitarian’ interventionism: in relation 
to the 1912 Mexican revolution, he asked: “Is it quite clear that the people of the United 
States have no duty whatever in regard to this matter, but should merely stand aside and let 
the various armed bands of Mexicans kill each other indefinitely…?”84 To anyone who 
perceives US power as an unadulterated good, there could only be a negative response. 
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  While the connection between democracy and peace was principally rhetorical and insecure 
before the 1980s and 1990s, it was also argued that it was unfit for practical policy 
application due to the existential threat from Soviet imperialism. Only after the collapse of 
communism, the argument goes, could democracy promotion truly come to the fore as 
authentic US foreign policy and national security strategy. However, the ‘democracy’ in 
democratic peace theory and democracy promotion was always subordinated to the perceived 
needs of US power as defined by leading elements of an enduring foreign policy 
establishment. Consequently, democracy meant market democracy organised around ‘free’ 
markets, a limited state, and fundamental protection of private property rights. Democracy 
also varied in definition from peoples to peoples – frowned upon as a right of the American 
masses as much as it was among those who did not fit their definition of civilised or 
advanced people. 
By the end of the Cold War, what began life as a relatively vague idea linking democracy and 
peace, had become enshrined as social scientific law legitimating a more or less aggressive 
national power strategy to replace the obsolete rationale of ‘containment’.  The major 
American foundations played a fundamental and long-term role, in close collaboration with 
state agencies, in bringing about this state of affairs. They remain central to American power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
